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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this consolidated appeal, we are asked to review the 
sentences of Samuel Roman, who pled guilty to possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine base and aiding and 
abetting, and Oscar Roman, who pled guilty to possession 
with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine base as 
well as carrying a firearm in connection with a drug- 
trafficking crime. The district court sentenced both Samuel 
and Oscar Roman to 188 months of imprisonment for the 
drug related offenses and imposed a consecutive sentence 
of five years on Oscar Roman for the firearm offense. Both 
 
                                2 
defendants contend that the district court erred by 
imposing enhancements for "crack cocaine" and concluding 
that the government had not breached their plea 
agreements by refusing to file a downward departure 
motion. Samuel Roman raises the additional argument that 
the district court erred by refusing his request for funds to 
retain a psychologist to testify on his behalf at sentencing. 
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
These prosecutions are based on three separate 
incidents. On September 2, 1994, during surveillance of the 
4400 block of North 4th Street, Philadelphia police officers 
observed Bobby Rodriguez and an unknown purchaser 
engage in a drug transaction with Samuel Roman. After the 
purchaser paid Rodriguez for the drugs, he handed the 
money to Roman. The police stopped Rodriguez and Roman 
and seized fifty vials of crack cocaine from Rodriguez and 
$494 in cash from Roman. 
 
On November 7, 1994, Philadelphia police officers, again 
surveilling the 4400 block of North 4th Street, saw William 
Serrano engage in a drug sale. An undercover officer then 
approached and purchased two vials of crack from Serrano. 
Serrano then handed the money to Oscar Roman, who was 
seated in a nearby car. Backup officers arrested Serrano 
and Roman. They seized eleven vials of crack from Serrano 
and a loaded weapon and $259 in cash from Roman. A 
subsequent search of the car disclosed additional "bundles" 
containing numerous vials of crack cocaine. 
 
On November 22, 1994, police officers were once again 
surveilling the same block of North 4th Street when they 
saw Samuel Roman hand a brown paper bag to Oscar 
Roman and another individual. Oscar Roman and the other 
individual then hid the paper bag in a vacant lot. Samuel 
collected money from the two and left. Police apprehended 
Samuel in a car shortly thereafter. They found $1,494 on 
his person and a bundle of suspected crack cocaine in the 
car. The officers searched the vacant lot and found the 
brown paper bag that Oscar and the other individual had 
hidden. It contained fourteen bundles of crack, and three 
more bundles were found nearby. 
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Samuel and Oscar Roman both were charged with 
possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine (21 
U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1)), and Oscar Roman was also charged 
with distribution of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)) 
and carrying a firearm in connection with a drug-trafficking 
crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). Defendants were initially named 
in an indictment that specifically charged them with 
offenses involving "crack cocaine." However, the government 
obtained a superseding indictment that identified the 
controlled substance at issue as "cocaine base." 
 
Both defendants pled guilty to all of the offenses in the 
superseding indictment pursuant to standard written plea 
agreements. In those agreements, each defendant agreed 
"to provide truthful, complete, and accurate information," 
"to provide all information concerning his knowledge of, and 
participation in, the distribution of cocaine base and any 
other crimes about which he has knowledge," and not to 
"protect any person or entity through false information or 
omission." App. at 19a-20a, 26a-27a. During the change-of- 
plea hearings that followed their initial plea of not guilty, 
the government clarified their obligations under the plea 
agreements by acknowledging that defendants could 
provide historical information only, and did not have to 
"engage in affirmative investigative techniques." App. at 
59a. 
 
A sentencing hearing was held on October 16, 1996. Both 
defendants argued that the government had the burden of 
proving that the controlled substance involved in this case 
was crack cocaine. To meet its burden, the government only 
presented the testimony of Officer Wilbert Kane, the officer 
assigned to the case. Kane had twelve years of experience 
in investigations and prosecutions of persons charged with 
crack cocaine distribution and had trained state and 
federal narcotics officers. Over defense objections, Kane 
testified that the substance seized from defendants was 
crack cocaine. His conclusion was based solely upon the 
way the substance was packaged. Kane conceded that the 
substance seized from the defendants did not contain 
sodium bicarbonate, a residue common in crack cocaine. 
However, he explained that the head of the police 
laboratory had told him that the absence of sodium 
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bicarbonate did not mean the substance was not crack 
because, if the "cook" was good, sodium bicarbonate would 
not be found in the finished crack. App. at 74a. 
 
Kane testified that he had seen crack cocaine cooked and 
that he had seen the substance that was seized from the 
defendants. For some reason, he was not asked to compare 
that crack's appearance with the substance seized from the 
defendants. He did, however, testify that the drugs taken 
from the defendants was in vials with color caps which is 
how crack cocaine is typically packaged for sale in 
Philadelphia. He testified that "powder cocaine," in contrast, 
is usually packaged in ziplock bags. App. at 75a. Based 
solely upon the packaging, Kane concluded that the 
substance seized from the defendants was crack. The court 
accepted that conclusion and sentenced the defendants 
accordingly over defense objections. 
 
Defendants also objected to the government's decision 
not to file a downward departure motion. They argued that 
this decision breached their plea agreements and that 
government investigators were angry because they were 
only able to provide "historical" information. The defendants 
maintained that they only had historical information and 
that their agreements did not require them to provide more. 
The government, however, argued that it was the Romans 
who breached the agreement by not providing complete 
information. In support of its argument, the government 
again presented the testimony of Officer Kane who testified 
that "the accumulation of intelligence that [the Romans] 
would have gathered while in the business far exceeded 
what they were willing to tell us in the proffer." App. at 83a. 
Kane conceded, however, that the information the Romans 
had provided was accurate. The district court concluded 
that the government had not breached the plea agreements. 
 
Samuel Roman was sentenced at the bottom of the 
applicable guidelines range to 188 months imprisonment. 
Oscar Roman was also sentenced to 188 months on the 
narcotics offenses as well as to a consecutive sentence of 60 
months stemming from his 924(c) conviction. These appeals 
followed. 
 
This Court has jurisdiction to review final sentences 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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Discussion 
 
II. 
 
Defendants contend that the district court erred in 
finding that the controlled substance involved in their case 
was crack cocaine and sentencing them pursuant to the 
guideline enhancement for that drug.1 The district court's 
determination that the substance seized from defendants 
was crack cocaine is a finding of fact that we review for 
clear error. See United States v. Johnson, 12 F.3d 760, 765 
(8th Cir. 1993). "Factual findings are clearly erroneous if 
the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, lack 
adequate evidentiary support in the record, are against the 
clear weight of the evidence or where the district court has 
misapprehended the weight of the evidence." Davin v. 
United States Dep't of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1049 (3d Cir. 
1995)(internal quotations omitted). However, "[t]his court 
has plenary review of issues of law raised by the district 
court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines." United 
States v. James, 78 F.3d 851, 855 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 128 (1996). 
 
In support of their argument, defendants cite our recent 
decision in United States v. James. There, the defendant 
was charged with distribution and possession of a 
"substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine 
base." Id. (emphasis added). He plead guilty to that charge 
and stipulated for sentencing purposes that "the relevant 
quantity of cocaine base is 57.4 grams." Id. at 856 
(emphasis added). At his plea colloquy the court asked 
"Now Mr. James, did you, as charged in Count One of the 
indictment . . . knowingly, intentionally and unlawfully 
distribute in excess of five grams of a mixture and 
substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base?" 
Id. (emphasis added). James answered this question 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Note D of section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines defines "cocaine 
base" as "crack." " `Crack' is the street name for a form of cocaine base, 
usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium 
bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form." U.S.S.G. 
§ 2D1.1 n.D. 
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affirmatively. However, during the plea colloquy, the 
government made several casual references to "crack": 
 
The parties agree that the relevant quantity of cocaine 
base . . . is 57.4 grams. That's the total net weight of 
the crack cocaine that was purchased . . . . 
 
 . . . . 
 
Mr. James exchanged a plastic baggy that contained 
some suspected crack cocaine. . . . I believe the net 
weight was 22.0 grams of cocaine base or crack 
cocaine. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). Although we recognized that 
"admissions to the court by a defendant during a guilty 
plea colloquy can be relied upon by the court at the 
sentencing stage," we concluded that these casual 
references, without more, did not "amount[ ] to a knowing 
and voluntary admission that the cocaine base constituted 
crack." Id. The government had the burden of showing by 
a "preponderance of the evidence that the substance in 
question was actually crack." Id. Because we concluded 
that the government had not met that burden, we vacated 
James's sentence under the crack cocaine enhancement 
and remanded for resentencing. 
 
Here, we conclude that the government did meet its 
burden but just barely. The government's only evidence was 
the testimony of Officer Kane. Kane is assigned to the task 
force of the Philadelphia Drug Enforcement Administration 
and admits that he is not a chemist. See app. at 77a. The 
district court, nevertheless, permitted him to state his 
opinion about the identity of the controlled substance 
involved in this case based upon his years of experience as 
a police officer. "Courts imposing sentence are free to 
consider a wide range of relevant material." United States v. 
Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 1993)(internal quotations 
omitted). Moreover, Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence "provides that opinion testimony is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided." United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 
591 (3d Cir. 1989)(internal quotations omitted). Thus, it 
was not improper for the district court to rely upon Kane's 
testimony at sentencing. 
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The substance seized from defendants did not contain 
sodium bicarbonate - a common residue in crack cocaine. 
See app. at 73a. However, Kane explained that the presence 
of that ingredient is not crucial "[I]t depends on the cooker 
and how precise he is in his measurements as to whether 
there would be sodium bicarbonate left behind after the 
crack cocaine cooking process is over." App. at 74a.2 
However, no evidence was presented about the expertise of 
the person who "cooked" the drugs seized from defendants.3 
 
Kane stressed that the substance seized from defendants 
was packaged in "clear plastic vials with color caps" which 
is how crack is commonly packaged on the streets of 
Philadelphia. App. at 75a. He, therefore, concluded that 
this substance was in fact "crack cocaine," see app. at 77a, 
and the strength of that conclusion was tested by cross 
examination. 
 
Although the identity of the substance defendants 
possessed need only be established by a preponderance of 
the evidence, "the preponderance standard is not toothless. 
It is the district court's duty to ensure that the Government 
carries this burden by presenting reliable and specific 
evidence." United States v. Lawrence, 47 F.3d 1559, 1566 
(11th Cir. 1995). Officer Kane has over twelve years of 
experience on the DEA task force, and, in that time, he has 
participated in over 1000 cases involving crack cocaine. 
Kane has also attended training sessions on cocaine 
conducted by the Philadelphia police chemical lab, and 
himself instructs other narcotics officers about identifying 
crack and prosecuting such cases. See app. at 74a-75a. 
Given Kane's experience and expertise, we conclude that 
the record adequately supports the district court's finding 
that the controlled substance here was crack cocaine.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 97 (3d Cir. 1989)(hearsay 
admissible at sentencing hearing). 
 
3. It is certainly understandable that the government would not know 
who manufactured a given seizure of drugs, and we do not fault the 
government for not presenting that evidence. We mention the absence of 
such testimony because it reduces (but does not negate) the probative 
value of Kane's explanation for the absence of sodium bicarbonate. 
 
4. We take this opportunity to express our concern over the manner in 
which the government chose to establish that the substance involved in 
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III. 
 
Defendants next contend that the district court erred in 
concluding that the government had not breached their 
plea agreements. "Whether the government's conduct 
violated the terms of the plea agreement is a question of 
law" to which this Court gives plenary review. United States 
v. Wilder, 15 F.3d 1292, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994)(internal 
quotations omitted); see also United States v. Hernandez, 
17 F.3d 78, 80-81 (5th Cir. 1994). As the parties alleging 
the breach, defendants "bear[ ] the burden of proving the 
underlying facts establishing a breach by a preponderance 
of the evidence." Wilder, 15 F.3d at 1295 (internal 
quotations omitted). "In determining whether the terms of 
the plea agreement have been violated, the court must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
this case was crack. We have previously emphasized the importance of 
correctly determining that a substance is crack because of the 100:1 
sentencing ratio for cocaine base, as compared to cocaine, under the 
Sentencing Guidelines. See James, 78 F.3d at 855. Indeed, the wisdom 
and fairness of that ratio, and the social consequences of it, have been 
discussed and debated in forums so vast and varied that they need not 
be referenced here. The wisdom of the policy is not for us to determine. 
However, we would hope that the government would take steps to 
provide a quality of proof that is consistent with the seriousness of the 
consequences of that distinction. 
 
We have recently stated that an indictment need not identify the 
controlled substance at issue as the identity is a factor for sentencing, 
and not an element of the offense. See United States v. Lewis, 113 F.3d 
487, 490 (3d Cir. 1997). However, where a written plea agreement is 
entered questions of notice and proof at sentencing could be greatly 
minimized by simply including language in the plea agreement by which 
a defendant acknowledges the identity of the drugs involved. Similarly, 
problems of proof could be eliminated by a specific inquiry of the 
defendant during the Rule 11 colloquy as opposed to only casual 
references to "crack" or "cocaine base." 
 
Given our limited standard of review here, we cannot say that the 
government's evidence was insufficient to carry its burden. As we noted 
above, the government did meet its burden and that ends our inquiry on 
that issue. Nevertheless, in view of our recent holding in James, we hope 
the proof presented in this case on the crucial issue of whether the 
substance was crack cocaine does not reflect a lack of appreciation for 
the seriousness of that determination or the consequences that flow from 
it. 
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determine whether the government's conduct is consistent 
with the parties' reasonable understanding of the 
agreement." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 
In Hernandez, the defendant pled guilty pursuant to a 
written agreement in which the government agreed to 
"recommend [that Hernandez receive] credit for acceptance 
of responsibility and a sentence at the low end of the 
guideline range." Id. at 80. The agreement was amended in 
court by the Assistant U.S. attorney who stated on the 
record "that if Mr. Hernandez should provide substantial 
assistance to the Government, either I guess through 
truthful information and testimony if necessary, that the 
Government may make a motion for downward departure at 
sentencing." Id. Following his guilty plea, Hernandez 
provided two types of assistance. "First, he gave the 
government a hand-drawn map that ostensibly showed 
where a stash of cocaine could be found." Id. "Second, 
Hernandez provided the government with information 
(which the government insists was `stale') concerning drug 
dealing and illegally possessed guns in the Corpus Christi 
area." Id. The government argued that the assistance was 
not substantial and refused to move for a downward 
departure at Hernandez's sentencing. He then appealed his 
sentence on grounds that the government had breached the 
plea agreement. "Considering the type of information that 
the government should have expected from a defendant like 
Hernandez, who had been incarcerated for over six months, 
[the court of appeals] f[ou]nd it difficult to conceive of what 
more Hernandez could have provided that would be 
substantial . . . ." Id. at 82. It therefore vacated his 
sentence and remanded to the district court for a 
determination of what the parties intended as "substantial 
assistance." 
 
Here, the government concedes that the defendants did 
provide truthful and accurate information, but insists that 
the information was not "complete" as required under the 
plea agreements. Officer Kane testified that "[he] believe[d] 
it was truthful, the information they gave us, although I did 
not believe it was full or complete." App. at 82a. "Because 
both of the defendants had been involved in the drug 
business, specifically crack cocaine for numerous years. 
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. . . the accumulation of intelligence that they would have 
gathered while in the business far exceeded what they were 
willing to tell us in the proffer." App. at 83a. Kane's 
suspicions are supported by the defendants' conduct 
during the "debriefing" sessions. Defendants demanded that 
they be interviewed together, and, during the interview, 
"one brother or the other would begin talking about 
something and the other brother would tell him, no, . . . 
we're not going to tell them about that. Often times they 
would laugh at each other." App. at 83a. From this 
testimony, the district court properly could conclude that 
the each defendant failed to provide "all information 
concerning his knowledge of, and participation in the 
distribution of cocaine base and other crimes about which 
he has knowledge" as was required by the agreement. App. 
at 19a, 26a-27a. 
 
We also agree with the district court that the 
government's in-court clarification of the terms of the plea 
agreements did not in any way alter defendants' obligation 
to provide complete information. In open court, the 
Assistant U.S. Attorney acknowledged that "it's the 
Government's expectation after the proffer that Mr. Roman, 
if the information he is able to provide proves truthful and 
accurate, that he would receive a downward departure 
motion and it would not be a barrier to receiving such a 
motion, simply that he could not engage in affirmative 
investigative techniques but that he solely may be able to 
provide historical information to the Government." App. at 
58a-59a. Defendants argue that, if they provided truthful, 
accurate, but incomplete historical information, the 
government was still obligated to move for a downward 
departure. See Appellant Br. at 16. (Appellant Oscar 
Roman)("There is no ambiguity in that language . . . Oscar 
Roman would receive a downward departure motion if the 
information he provided met two criteria -- truthfulness 
and accuracy . . . ."). We disagree. Instead, we believe that 
the district court correctly interpreted this statement to 
mean that "the fact that [the information defendants 
provided] was simply historical would not, in and of itself, 
prevent it from qualifying as substantial assistance." App. 
at 143a. Therefore, we find no error in the district court's 
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determination that the government did not breach the plea 
agreement by refusing to file a downward departure motion. 
 
IV. 
 
Samuel Roman alleges error in the district court's denial 
of his request for CJA funds to retain a psychiatrist. In 
appropriate cases a court can order that such funds be 
provided to assist an indigent defendant in preparing for 
sentencing. 
 
Counsel for a person who is financially unable to 
obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary 
for adequate representation may request them in an ex 
parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate 
inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are 
necessary and that the person is financially unable to 
obtain them, the court . . . shall authorize counsel to 
obtain the services. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). However, a court should first 
"satisfy itself that a defendant may have a plausible 
defense." United States v. Alden, 767 F.2d 314, 318 (7th 
Cir. 1984)(emphasis added). "The decision to grant or deny 
a motion under section 3006A(e) is one committed to the 
discretion of the district court, and a district court's 
decision will be disturbed on appeal only if it constitutes an 
abuse of discretion." Id. at 319. 
 
Samuel Roman wanted a psychiatrist "to testify at 
sentencing in support of his motion for a downward 
departure . . . based on mental and emotional conditions 
and diminished capacity." Appellant Br. at 12 (Appellant 
Samuel Roman). His mental and emotional condition, he 
claimed, was "due to, (a) the murder of his father, (b) the 
fact that from the age of five years old, he grew up without 
a father, and (c) his extensive abuse of drugs and alcohol." 
Appellant Br. at 15 (Appellant Samuel Roman). 
 
Under the Guidelines, those factors do not warrant a 
downward departure. Section 5H1.4 of the Guidelines 
states that "[d]rug or alcohol dependence or abuse is not a 
reason for imposing a sentence below the guidelines." 
U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 (emphasis added). Section 5H1.12 states 
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that "[l]ack of guidance as a youth and similar 
circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing are not 
relevant grounds for imposing a sentence outside the 
applicable guideline range." U.S.S.G. § 5H1.12 (emphasis 
added). Taken together, these sections demonstrate that the 
facts of his case did not warrant a downward departure. 
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
by denying Samuel Roman funds to retain a psychiatrist to 
testify in support of that departure. 
 
He also claims that this denial "deprived him of his rights 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the 
United States Constitution." Appellant Br. at 12 (Appellant 
Samuel Roman). For this proposition, he cites Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). In Ake, the Supreme Court 
held that, when a capital defendant demonstrates that his 
mental condition is a significant factor at his sentencing 
phase, he is "entitled to the assistance of a psychiatrist . . . 
and [ ] the denial of that assistance deprive[s] him of due 
process." Id. at 87. The Court recognized, however, that "[a] 
defendant's mental condition is not necessarily at issue in 
every criminal proceeding . . . and it is unlikely that 
psychiatric assistance . . . would be of probable value in 
cases where it is not." Id. at 82. "The variable on which [a 
court] must focus is, therefore, the probable value the 
assistance of a psychiatrist will have . . . and the risk 
attendant on its absence." Id. at 84. Since the psychiatric 
testimony that Samuel Roman wanted to present would 
have been irrelevant, the court did deprive him of due 
process in refusing to authorize funds for a psychiatrist. 
 
V. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm defendants' 
judgments of sentence entered on October 16, 1996. 
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